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While social policy falls predominantly under national rather than European 
Union (EU) jurisdiction, there are nonetheless multiple ways in which social 
policy and social outcomes in EU member states have been affected by EU 
membership. This paper draws on existing evidence and analysis to review the 
consequences for UK social policy of the decision to leave the EU. We focus 
predominantly on the implications of the British Government’s pledge to ‘take 
back control’ of money, borders and laws. Our conclusion is that Brexit is likely 
to have negative effects on the quality of public services and, for some groups in 
particular, social rights, and that these effects are likely to be greater the more 
distant the future trading and wider relationships between the UK and the EU27.  
 






What impact will the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU) have on 
social policy? The most obvious implications are those facing citizens travelling 
between the UK and the remaining 27 member states for work, play or study, 
and needing to access social security or healthcare. But Brexit is also likely to 
have long-term consequences for social policy and social outcomes within the 
UK, while the absence of the UK from EU decision-making may ultimately affect 
social policy in the EU. This paper concentrates on the implications for the UK. 
Drawing on existing evidence and analysis, it considers how public services, 
living standards and social and employment rights have been affected by EU 
membership, and hence the likely implications of the decision to leave. (For 
discussion of the implications of Brexit for social policy in the EU, see Hantrais, 
2019). 
 
While the social dimension of the EU has grown in scope, most aspects of social 
policy, including social security, health care and education, remain solidly under 
national jurisdiction, arguably in some part due to UK resistance to deeper social 
integration (Hantrais, 2019). The most direct way in which social policy is 
affected by EU membership is through the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which 
in addition to employment protection covers work-family balance and rights to 
social and housing assistance, protection and care of children and older people 
and preventive health care (Hantrais, 2007). There have been extensive efforts 
to monitor and coordinate wider social progress through European 
observatories and networks and, from 2006, through the Open Method of 
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Coordination but these did not require or create policy convergence (Cantillon et 
al, 2018; Hantrais, 2019). However, while the implications of Brexit for UK social 
policy include the potential loss of the Charter, they go well beyond this.  
 
The paper takes as an organizing framework the goals encapsulated in the 
referendum slogan of the Vote Leave campaign, a slogan subsequently adopted 
by the UK government: “taking back control of our borders, money and laws” 
(HM Government 2018a). These are the outcomes that the UK public were 
promised. What will they mean in practice for the substance of the policies that 
affect day-to-day life? We start by considering the social policy implications of 
ending free movement (taking back control of borders). We then look at what 
withdrawal will mean for the size of the fiscal envelope (money). Last, we 
explore the consequences of gaining control over rules on human and workers’ 




A fall in EU migration looks inevitable as a result of Brexit. Even before any rule 
changes, net EU migration fell sharply from over 200,000 in the year ending 
early 2016 to 50,000 in late 2019, the lowest level since 2004 (ONS, 2020). From 
January 2021 existing overall caps on skilled migrants will be lifted but a new 
points-based immigration system will govern entry for EU and non-EU citizens 
alike. New arrivals will need to speak English and to have a job offer in a skilled 
profession at a minimum salary level (£25,600), with some flexibility on salary 
for those in shortage occupations or with certain PhD qualifications (UK 
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Government, 2020). The social policy implications of lower numbers of EU 
migrants depends on both their contribution to public service delivery and on 
the pressure they place on service use. 
 
Net	contributors	or	net	beneficiaries?	
Despite perceptions of ‘welfare tourism’ – that EU migrants move to the UK to 
take advantage of benefits or public services – EU citizens have only ever had full 
access to social security provision in other member states if they are workers or 
family members of workers. In practice, the weight of evidence strongly suggests 
that migrants from European Economic Area (EEA) countries to the UK pay more 
in taxes than UK-born residents, and more than they receive in benefits or social 
provision. This is partly because EEA migrants tend to be younger and more 
likely to be working than the UK-born population. 
 
Looking at taxation and cash benefits only, official UK government data shows 
EEA migrants making a net fiscal contribution, although with variation by 
country of origin (European Citizen Action Service, 2014). On average, EEA 
migrants are estimated to pay around £2,300 more in tax annually than the 
average adult resident, reflecting both high employment and relatively high 
earnings (MAC, 2018). 
 
There is less data on service use (housing, health, education and public goods), 
but modelling based on a range of assumptions tells a positive story.  EEA 
migrants arriving between 1995 and 2011 are estimated to have made a net 
positive contribution 10% larger than that of the UK-born population, although 
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non-EEA migrants made a negative contribution (Dustmann and Frattini, 2014). 
Rowthorn (2014) challenges some of Dustmann and Frattini’s assumptions – for 
example, the allocation of no cost to migrants for energy, transport and 
communications, on grounds that these are public goods – yet also concludes 
that recent EEA migrants have either paid their way or generated a modest fiscal 
surplus.  
 
A comprehensive picture would need calculations across the life-course. These 
would be expected to present a more positive picture than static models, in part 
because those migrating as adults have had education and childhood health costs 
covered elsewhere. Migrants arriving between 1995 and 2011 are estimated to 
have imported human capital that would have cost £14 billion if produced in the 
UK education system (Dustmann and Frattini, 2014). In addition, some migrants 
may return to their original country in retirement, saving health costs for the UK. 
The MAC’s dynamic model estimates that the 515,000 migrants who arrived in 
2016 will make a discounted net contribution of £26.9 billion in their lifetime, or 
£78,000 per capita (MAC, 2018).  
 
Service	use	
EEA migrants may make a net contribution overall and yet still create pressures 
on particular services or areas. In terms of health, there is some limited evidence 
to this effect. Probably because they are relatively young and healthy, migrants 
appear around half as likely to have a hospital admission as the general 
population (MAC, 2018), though birth rates are higher among EU migrants than 
the UK-born, making maternity services an exception (Steventon and Bardsley, 
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2011). Having more migrants in the local population has been found to reduce 
waiting times for health services (Guintella et al, 2015), and while migrants are 
slightly more likely to use GP services than the UK-born population (Wadsworth, 
2012), there is little evidence of any relationship between local migrant share 
and GP satisfaction beyond a positive impact of EU13+ migrants (MAC, 2018). 
However, the effect on waiting times identified by Guintella et al is largest in the 
least deprived areas, and a short-run negative impact was identified following 
the 2004 EU enlargement: higher immigration was found to increase the average 
waiting time in deprived areas outside London.  Particularly in the context of the 
squeeze in UK health spending relative to need since 2010 (Vizard and 
Obolenskaya, 2015), migrant populations may thus be felt in some 
disadvantaged areas as contributing to excess pressure on services.  
 
Social housing is another public service where EU migrants are perceived to 
increase pressure on scarce resources. Social housing in the UK tends to be 
considerably cheaper than renting privately and has more stable tenures, 
making it a valuable and highly rationed good. A significant share of white 
Britons report feeling discriminated against by social landlords in relation to 
other ethnic groups (Battiston et al, 2014). In practice, there is no evidence of 
migrants being given priority (Vargas-Silva, 2017), but different rules apply in 
different areas and are not always transparent, and some groups of migrants 
may have characteristics that confer priority, feeding misperceptions (Rutter and 
Latorre, 2009). Even without discrimination in favour of migrants, immigration 
will reduce access to social housing for the UK-born in a context in which supply 
is inflexible. EEA migrants comprised only 3.4% of all social housing residents in 
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2017, but the share of new lettings going to UK-born tenants fell from 95% in 
2007 to 92% in 2016, with a rising share going to EU migrants (MAC, 2018). 
Particularly in areas in which EU migration is very concentrated, this does 
suggest more competition and a reduced likelihood of a tenancy for UK-born 
families on the housing waiting list. 
 
EEA migrants are more likely than other UK residents to have children of school-
age, and have higher birth rates, as noted, so EU immigration has created 
additional demand for school places. But this does not mean migrant pupils 
impede either schooling options or outcomes for other pupils. No statistically 
significant relationship has been found between the migrant share in a local 
education authority and the percentage of parents receiving their first 
preference of school (MAC, 2018). Studies have also found either no effect or a 
positive effect of the number of children with English as an Additional Language 




The effects of lower EU migration on the ability to deliver public services are 
likely to be much more substantial than any impact on demand. This is not the 
case in all sectors: in primary and secondary schools, EEA born teachers make up 
just 3% of the teaching workforce compared to 8% of pupils who have at least 
one EEA-born parent (MAC, 2018). But it is relevant to housing, where 
insufficient new construction to replace sales of existing stock appears to be the 
main reason for the falling probability of living in social housing for UK-born 
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households (Vargas-Silva et al, 2016). Some 18% of the home-building 
workforce comes from an EU country, including 50% of the workforce in London 
(Home Building Federation, 2017). Many of these workers are unlikely to fulfil 
the criteria for entry under the new points-based system. 
 
Lower EEA immigration could also have significant effects on the workforce in 
health and social care. EU nationals make up 5% of NHS workers in NHS England, 
including around 10% of doctors and higher percentages for some specialisms 
(Hervey and McCloskley, 2018). In 2015 almost a third of newly registered 
nurses had trained in the EEA (Dayan, 2017). This is in a context of cuts in UK 
funding for training and growing staff shortages: one in ten nursing posts and 
more than 50,000 clinical roles were estimated to be unfilled at the time of the 
referendum (NAO, 2016; Simpkin and Mossialos, 2017). There are also shortages 
in social care, where EU nationals make up 7% of the total workforce, rising to 
13% in London (DoH, 2017). Projections for 2025/26 indicate shortages of 
between 20,000 and 50,000 nurses and 70,000 careworkers if EU migration falls 
substantially (Dayan, 2017).  
 
The points-based system will allow the continued arrival of doctors with job 
offers, and of nurses if nursing is listed as a ‘shortage occupation’ and thus 
exempt from minimum salary thresholds. The theory is that workforce needs can 
be met while allowing more control over migration than free movement allows. 
But the strategy relies on skilled migrants continuing to see the UK as an 
attractive destination: a weaker economy, a depreciated currency and 
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perceptions of a less tolerant society may work against this, as the fall in net EU 
migration to date may indicate.  
 
An alternative longer-term response is for the UK to train and employ more UK-
born workers. This offers potential advantages to young UK citizens but would 
require substantial investment, both in training and in higher wages, in a context 
of tightly stretched resources. It costs an estimated £200,000 to train a doctor in 
the UK (Simpkin and Mossialos, 2017); currently the NHS reaps the benefits of 
investment made by other countries. In social care, training costs are lower, but 
the sector faces competition from other low-skilled sectors like retail. A wage 
increase would likely be required, beyond the National Minimum Wage, carrying 
significant funding implications in a sector where wages form 50% of costs 




The challenges arising from reduced EU migration could be much mitigated by 
increased public spending. Leaving the EU should give the UK Treasury a ‘Brexit 
dividend’ – or so it has been claimed.1 Taking back control of the money spent on 
EU membership fees was a key plank of the referendum campaign, with the 
controversial ‘Brexit bus’ promising millions in increased investment for the 
NHS.2 In practice, however, such savings are projected to be swamped by the 
losses from slower economic growth.  
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Uncertainty about the medium-term economic implications of Brexit remains 
high, and not only because future trading relationships are still to be negotiated, 
nor because of the additional economic challenges arising from COVID-19. 
Leaving a major trading bloc is almost entirely without precedent, and Brexit 
involves simultaneous shocks to trade, migration, financial services, regional aid, 
industrial strategy and more (Oxrep, 2017). Nonetheless, there is strong 
consensus on two points: that the impact on GDP growth of any Brexit scenario 
will be negative compared to remaining in the EU, and that the effects will be 
larger for ‘harder’ forms of Brexit (Dhingra et al, 2016; Sampson, 2017; HM 
Government, 2018b). UK government projections prior to the COVID-19 crisis 
fell broadly in the middle of a range of available estimates: a 1.6% reduction in 
income per capita 15 years on if the UK left the EU but followed the Norway 
model (EEA membership); a 4.8% reduction under a negotiated Free Trade 
Arrangement (FTA) (Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s stated goal); and 7.7% 
under World Trade Organisation rules (the ‘no deal’ scenario) (House of 
Commons Exiting the EU Committee, 2018).  
 
Economic models are scarcely infallible, and projections for the immediate 
economic impact of a Leave vote were overly pessimistic (Singham and Tylecote, 
2018). Yet forecasts of the impact through to the end of 2018 were very close to 
the mark, with predicted effects simply coming later than anticipated (Schulz, 
2018; Smith, 2018). If negative economic effects do play out, they carry 
implications both for average living standards and for public spending. 
Projections by the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (prior to the 
COVID pandemic) anticipated a hit to public revenue of about £15 billion a year 
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by the early 2020s; double in the event of no deal (OBR, 2018; OBR, 2019). 
Looking further ahead, the government projected annual borrowing in 2033-34 
at around £20 billion higher than the status quo for the EEA model, £55 billion 
higher for the FTA model and £80 billion for WTO (House of Commons Exiting 
the EU Committee, 2018). These estimates include budget savings from EU 
contributions – roughly £8 billion (below 1% of GDP) after accounting for the 
budget rebate and existing EU spending in the UK (Levell and Stoye, 2018).  
 
The impact of the COVID-19 response dwarfs these numbers in the short-term. 
UK borrowing for 2020-21 has been projected at £218 billion higher than 
previously anticipated, with debt remaining 10% of GDP higher than forecast in 
2024-25 (OBR, 2020). Yet the underlying economic challenges posed by leaving 
the single market and customs union are not changed by the COVID response; 
rather they will now be added to an already exceptionally difficult fiscal position. 
Leaving the EU will mean less money for public spending rather than more, at a 




After Brexit, if the UK leaves the single market, it will no longer be subject to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights enforced by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU). This can be seen as a key aspect of ‘taking back control’ of 
decision-making relevant to social policy. Currently, EU law takes supremacy 
over any conflicting laws of member states and also confers freedoms and rights 
on EU citizens which cover social and workers’ rights, citizens’ rights, justice, 
 12 
dignity, discrimination and political freedoms (see Bojarski et al, 2014 for a full 
summary).  
 
The relationship between EU and UK law on rights has been dynamic and 
interactive, not a one-way street: at times the UK has made progressive changes 
that have subsequently been incorporated into EU law, while in other cases the 
EU has pushed the UK forward (Fredman et al, 2018). For example, the UK was 
ahead of the EU in legislating against race and disability discrimination, while EU 
law has had greatest impact in relation to sex discrimination and work-life 
balance legislation. Important EU-driven protections for precarious workers in 
the form of directives covering part-time, fixed-term and agency workers may 
never have been gained under UK law given the backdrop of zero hours 
contracts (Fredman et al, 2018). The Working Time Directive, which includes 
rights to rest, maximum working hours and protection for night workers, was 
implemented late in the UK and after considerable resistance, with numerous 
challenges from the CJEU due to the government’s minimalist implementation 
(Ford, 2016). On the other hand, there are areas where UK provision currently 
exceeds EU minimum standards, including entitlement to annual leave and the 
right to flexible working.  
 
Outside the single market, the UK will remain subject to the European 
Convention on Human Rights; this is part of international not EU law, with rights 
and obligations enforced through the domestic courts and the European Court of 
Human Rights, not the CJEU (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2017). 
This covers civil and political but not social or economic rights. The European 
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Social Charter (a Council of Europe treaty) will also still apply, and does include 
social rights, but has no mechanism for judicial enforcement. Without the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, it is argued that the UK will be left with a 
weakening of equality protection and important gaps in human rights protection, 
including the free-standing right to non-discrimination, the rights of the child, 
the right to dignity and the right to health (Coppel, 2018; Roderick and Pollock, 
2017). The UK Equality Acts  of 2006 and 2010 provide some protection, 
including against discrimination, but these rights are not constitutionally 
protected and could be amended at any time. It will also be harder for 
individuals to seek legal redress when rights are violated, as EU law played an 
important remedial role with stronge mechansims for enforcement (Coppel, 
2018; Harvey, 2018). 
  
In practice, the result may be downward pressure on employment protection in 
particular, with greatest impact on workers in more precarious employment. 
This will disproportionately affect women, who are more likely to work part-
time and have temporary contracts, in addition to the potential threat to rights 
gained for pregnant workers and in relation to sex discrimination law (TUC, 
2016; Mott et al, 2018). Concerns have also been raised about the loss of 
protections gained from the EU for LGBT+ workers and workers with disabilities 
(Roache, 2018a,b). An enhancement of rights in response to greater power is of 
course possible but seems unlikely, not only because of the UK’s track record, but 
also because many EU directives explicitly provide a floor and not a ceiling; 
stronger protection has always been possible (Ford, 2016). There are however 
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some methods of pursuring equality goals that are currently restricted, for 
example affirmative action (Fredman et al, 2018). 
 
Greater freedom for the UK in relation to workers’ rights can be seen as restoring 
democractic power to Westminster: Britain will no longer have legislation 
imposed by Brussels that British voters would not have supported. However, the 
context facing the UK makes it plausible that employment rights may fall subject 
to wider economic priorities. Employment deregulation could mitigate some of 
the negative economic effects discussed earlier while also helping to attract 
foreign investment to a UK outside the EU. Workers’ rights could also be on the 
table during trade negotiations: matching EU employment protection will very 
likely be a requirement of ongoing close trade relations with the EU (Harvey, 
2018; O’Cinneide, 2018), but if such an agreement is not reached, the UK may 
prioritise commercial interests and deregulation in attempts to secure trade 
deals with other countries (Harrison et al, 2017). If rights legislation becomes a 
bargaining chip in this way, it is questionable how far UK voters will be gaining 




Most aspects of social policy provision remain under national, not EU 
jurisdiction, and on the surface, it may seem that the most serious implications of 
Brexit for social policy are those affecting the rights to social security and 
healthcare of those travelling across the UK-EU border to study, work or retire. 
Yet EU membership has improved social policy provision for UK citizens in 
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several important ways. One key mechanism is indirect: the benefits of EU 
membership for the economy have meant more money - higher living standards 
and greater possibilities for public spending. In addition, the free movement of 
workers has allowed public services in Britain to enjoy an inflow of skilled 
labour to fill workforce gaps, most notably in health, social care and 
construction. EU membership has also facilitated participation in coordinating 
mechanisms that have, among other things, improved access to medicines, 
enhanced research collaborations and increased the effectiveness of policing. 
And membership has ensured that UK workers have been beneficiaries of 
coordinated action to improve employment rights and prevent a competitive 
‘race to the bottom’ to secure external investment.  
 
Have there been downsides? Regaining greater control over borders, money and 
laws have been repeatedly identified in the UK as arguments in favour of leaving 
the EU. In terms of borders, some communities may have experienced the arrival 
of large numbers of migrants from other parts of Europe as unsettling and may 
have perceived a link between immigration and longer waiting lists. But the 
evidence points to negligible objective impact of EEA immigration either on 
employment and wages, or on access to services including health and housing, 
and shows EEA migrants making a net contribution to the exchequer. In terms of 
money, the costs of EU membership have been shown to be far outweighed by 
the benefits to the economy; there will be no ‘Brexit dividend’ to allocate.  
 
It is in terms of laws that the arguments for Brexit may be strongest: there are 
examples of the UK being forced by EU requirements into actions that it would 
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not otherwise have taken, for example in relation to aspects of employment 
protection. It may be said that Brexit offers genuinely greater national 
democratic control in this regard – the ability to become a lower-tax, lower-
regulation economy, if that is what UK voters want. Yet decisions about workers’ 
rights may very well end up being taken behind closed doors as part of complex 
trade negotiations – not obviously more democratic than being taken in Brussels. 
It is also far from clear that the ability to choose fewer rights at work were 
among the goals of those voting to leave. They were certainly never put forward 
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